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AAn Intrapersonal Addition Paradox*
Jacob M. Nebel
I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argu-
ment is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argu-
ment is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puz-
zle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way.
Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make deci-
sions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend
on what we do. Third, it suggests various difficulties for leading views about
the value of a person’s life compared to her nonexistence.
Many of us want to avoid what Parfit calls*
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ll use The “Repugnant Conclusion”: “Compared with the existence of
very many people—say, ten billion—all of whom have a very high
quality of life, there must be some much larger number of people
whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even
though these people would have lives that are barely worth living.”1The repugnant conclusion is an implausible consequence of classical
utilitarianism. But it is not just a problem for classical utilitarians. It fol-
lows from premises whose plausibility does not depend on any utilitarian
doctrine—or, indeed, on any brand of welfarism or consequentialism.
That is one lesson of Parfit’s mere addition paradox and of the impossi-
bility theorems it has inspired.2For helpful comments and discussion, I am grateful to Cian Dorr, Kara Dreher,
n Frick, Ben Holguín, Kacper Kowalczyk, Harvey Lederman, Jacob Ross, Trevor
, Daniel Viehoff, Ralph Wedgwood, Jake Zuehl, two anonymous reviewers, and audi-
at the University of Southern California, the London School of Economics, and New
niversity. I am especially grateful to Samuel Scheffler for extremely helpful feedback
eral stages throughout this project.
. Derek Parfit, “Overpopulation and the Quality of Life,” in Applied Ethics, ed. Peter
r (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 145–64, 150.
. See Yew-Kwang Ng, “What Should We Do about Future Generations? Impossibility
fit’s Theory X,” Economics and Philosophy 5 (1989): 235–53; Tyler Cowen, “What DoWe
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AUnfortunately, I have no solution to the problem of avoiding the re-
pugnant conclusion. My aim is to make the problem even more difficult.
I provide a new kind of argument for the repugnant conclusion that I
believe to be more compelling than the existing arguments—in particu-
lar, than the mere addition paradox. Unlike existing arguments for the
repugnant conclusion, my argument does not appeal directly to contro-
versial comparisons between outcomes in which different numbers of
people would exist, or in which some people would fare better than
others. Instead, my argument appeals to principles about what is good
for a person under conditions of uncertainty, and to further principles
that connect the prospective good of an individual to the impartial good-
ness of outcomes. The argument shows that, in order to avoid the repug-
nant conclusion, it will not be enough to reject some plausible claims
about the comparative value of populations; it may also require some
radical moves in the theories of prudential value and of moral and ratio-
nal choice under uncertainty.
Some people are happy to accept the repugnant conclusion. If you
are one such person, then you may welcomemy argument. I am not happy
to accept the repugnant conclusion. Nor am I comfortable rejecting any
premise of the argument. I therefore regard the argument as a para-
dox, rather than a proof. But even if the repugnant conclusion simply
leaves you cold, you may nonetheless find interest in the argument. For
it raises some puzzling questions about the value of a person’s life com-
pared to her nonexistence and about how to make decisions under un-
certainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what
we do.
I start by reviewing a version of the mere addition paradox, before
turning to develop my own argument. My argument proceeds in two
stages: first, an argument, structurally analogous to themere addition par-
adox, for an intrapersonal analogue of the repugnant conclusion; and sec-
ond, an argument from the intrapersonal analogue to Parfit’s repugnant
conclusion. The paradox consists of both stages of the argument together.
The rest of the article is about how the argument might be resisted. I con-
clude with some speculations about the repugnance of the repugnant
conclusion.Learn from the Repugnant Conclusion?,” Ethics 106 (1996): 754–75; Charles Blackorby
et al., “Critical Levels and the (Reverse) Repugnant Conclusion,” Journal of Economics 67
(1998): 1–15; Erik Carlson, “Mere Addition and Two Trilemmas of Population Ethics,” Eco-
nomics and Philosophy 14 (1998): 283–306; Gustaf Arrhenius, “An Impossibility Theorem for
Welfarist Axiologies,” Economics and Philosophy 16 (2000): 247–66; Philip Kitcher, “Parfit’s
Puzzle,” Noûs 34 (2000): 550–77. For a critical perspective, see Teruji Thomas, “Some Pos-
sibilities in Population Axiology,” Mind 127 (2017): 807–32.
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AI. THE MERE ADDITION PARADOX
In this section, I lay out a version of the mere addition paradox.3 I do not
necessarily endorse the argument. But having it on the table will make it
easier to follow, and to appreciate the significance of, my analogous in-
trapersonal argument.
Consider the outcomes in table 1: A, A1, and Z. The rows represent
these outcomes’ distributions of well-being. The first two columns repre-
sent the welfare of different groups of people in these outcomes; the
next two columns display the total and average well-being in each out-
come. The number in each cell (if there is one) represents the welfare
of the relevant group (column) in that outcome (row). (An empty cell
represents nonexistence.) These numbers are supposed to be values on
an interpersonal ratio scale of well-being. This means, for example, that
one person’s life at level 2 is twice as good as any other person’s life at level 1.
I assume that a life at level 100 is very good, that a life at level 2 is barely
worth living (for brevity, mediocre), and that a life at any positive level is
worth living. If you have doubts about ratio-scale measurement of well-
being, please set them aside; my own argument will not require numerical
representations.
In A, there are ten billion people, all with very happy lives. In A 1,
those same people are better off, but there is a much larger group of
9.99 trillion people, in some distant corner of the universe, with medio-
cre lives.4 In Z, both groups of people exist, all with mediocre lives, but
better than the mediocre lives in A 1. The relevant instance of the re-
pugnant conclusion is that Z is better than A—at least, if other things
are equal. (This ceteris paribus clause restricts our attention to the value
of well-being. If the goodness of outcomes depends on factors other than
their distributions of well-being, we set them aside, by imagining the out-
comes to be equally good in all other relevant respects. I omit this qualifi-
cation in what follows, but it should be understood to hold throughout the
article.)3. This version is closer to the versions in Thomas Schwartz, “Welfare Judgments and
Future Generations,” Theory and Decision 11 (1979): 181–94, and Michael Huemer, “In De-
fence of Repugnance,” Mind 117 (2008): 899–933, than to Parfit’s original. Parfit first pub-
lished his version after Schwartz in “Future Generations: Further Problems,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 11 (1982): 113–72, but his argument had already been discussed by Peter
Singer, “A Utilitarian Population Principle,” in Ethics and Population, ed. Michael Bayles
(Cambridge: Schenkman, 1976), 81–99, and Jeff McMahan, “Problems of Population The-
ory,” Ethics 92 (1981): 96–127, based on a draft called “Overpopulation” circulated as early
as 1973.
4. On some views, it is morally irrelevant that the same people exist in both A and A1.
I do not claim that this feature is morally relevant. But it may make the argument—which,
again, I do not necessarily endorse—more compelling to some people and no less compel-
ling to anyone. And its analogue in the intrapersonal case may be important.
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AHere is an argument to the conclusion that Z is better than A. I pre-
sent it in my own voice, but, again, I do not necessarily endorse it.
First, A1 is better than A. This is because A1 is better for everyone
who would exist in A, and would otherwise differ from A only via the ad-
dition of lives worth living. This should make A1 better than A. For even
if we doubt that the addition of lives worth living would, by itself, make
the world better, their existence should not, intuitively, “swallow up” (as
Broome puts it) the benefit to all of the A people.5 (So goes the argu-
ment.)
Next, Z is better than A 1. These two outcomes contain the exact
same people. The average—and therefore total—well-being is greater in
Z, and this greater quantity of well-being is more equally distributed in
Z, to the benefit of the (vastly more numerous) worse-off. For these rea-
sons, Z should be better than A 1. (So goes the argument.)
But if Z is better than A 1, which is better than A, then Z must be
better than A, by the transitivity of better than (which I assume throughout
the article, along with the transitivity of equal goodness).6 Therefore, Z
must be better than A. But that seems repugnant. This argument from
seemingly true premises to a seemingly false conclusion is a version of
the mere addition paradox.
The argument’s premises are plausible, but they are far from incon-
trovertible. I mention some responses to the argument in Section IV.A.
The various responses and their problems have led debate about themere
addition paradox to somewhat of a stalemate, with nothing close to con-
sensus as to where, or whether, the argument goes wrong.(200
the T
Temk
(198
(199
ford:
Bad,
ll useTABLE 1
The Mere Addition Paradox
10 Billion People 9.99 Trillion People Total Average
A 100 1 trillion 100
A 1 111 1 11.1 trillion 1.11
Z 2 2 20 trillion 25. John B
5): 399–41
6. The tra
ransitivity
in, “Intra
7): 138–87
6): 175–21
Oxford U
and the T
Thi
 subject toroome, “Should We
3, 409.
nsitivity of better than
of Better Than,” Austral
nsitivity and the Mer
; “A Continuum Argu
0; and Rethinking the G
niversity Press, 2012).
ransitivity of Better Tha
s content downloaded f
 University of Chicago Value Population?,” Jou
is questioned by Stuart R
asian Journal of Philosophy
e Addition Paradox,” P
ment for Intransitivity,”
ood: Moral Ideals and the N
I defend transitivity in Ja
n,” Noûs 52 (2018): 874–
rom 192.236.036.029 on D
Press Terms and Conditionrnal of Political
achels, “Counte
76 (1998): 71–83
hilosophy and Pu
Philosophy and Pu
ature of Practical R
cob M. Nebel, “T
99.
ecember 23, 201
s (http://www.joPhilosophy 13
rexamples to
; and Larry S.
blic Affairs 16
blic Affairs 25
easoning (Ox-
he Good, the
8 03:38:34 AM
urnals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Nebel Intrapersonal Addition Paradox 313
AIn the next two sections, I develop a new argument for the repugnant
conclusion. The first part of the argument, developed in Section II, is an
intrapersonal variation on the mere addition paradox. The intrapersonal
case differs from the interpersonal case in two main ways. First, instead of
comparing outcomes, we compare uncertain prospects. We imagine an
agent whose uncertainty is distributed among multiple states of the
world—mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive propositions over which
the agent has no causal influence (e.g., whether or not it will rain). Each
prospect available to the agent assigns an outcome to each state of the
world (e.g., the prospect of not bringing an umbrella yields an unhappy
outcome if it rains, a fine outcome if it doesn’t). Second, instead of asking
which outcomes or prospects are better or worse, or ought to be preferred
from an impartial perspective, we ask which are better or worse for some
particular person—that is, which ought to be preferred for that person’s
sake by a fully rational agent concerned solely with her interests.7 In Sec-
tion III, I explain how we can derive conclusions about the impartial good-
ness of outcomes from claims about the prudential value of prospects.
One attractive feature of my argument is that it will not imply either
premise of the mere addition paradox. So even if you reject one or both
premises of the argument above, you might nonetheless find my argu-
ment compelling.
II. THE INTRAPERSONAL ARGUMENT
In this section, I first state an intrapersonal analogue of the repugnant con-
clusion and then present an argument for that intrapersonal conclusion.
A. The Intrapersonal Analogue of the Repugnant Conclusion
I introduce the intrapersonal analogue of the repugnant conclusion with
a case.
Suppose that some couple wants to conceive a child by injecting a
single sperm into a single egg. Suppose that only one person could pos-
sibly originate from this pair of gametes—call her Sally. If they inject the
sperm as planned (prospect Z—script letters denote prospects), Sally’s
life will certainly be mediocre. But the couple has another, risky option
(prospect A). They can co-inject, along with the sperm, some other ma-
terial that would either (in state 1) greatly increase Sally’s quality of life
or (in state 2) prevent the sperm from fertilizing the egg.8 The couple is
rationally confident to degree p that state 1 obtains.7. For this gloss on prudential value, see, e.g., Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey,
“Priority or Equality for Possible People?,” Ethics 126 (2016): 929–54.
8. Although the case involves an obviously unrealistic degree of idealization, the gen-
eral idea of intracytoplasmic co-injection of sperm with other material is not science fic-
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AThe couple’s options are depicted in table 2. The columns repre-
sent states of the world. The rows represent the prospects available to
the couple. a is the welfare level of some very happy life. z is the welfare
level of some mediocre life, which I will imagine to be “painless but
drab,” containing only simple pleasures like “muzak and potatoes.”9 We
need not assume that these welfare levels can be represented by numbers.
Which of these prospects is better for Sally? The answer seems to
depend on the value of p. If p 5 1, A would of course be better for Sally,
because it would guarantee her a much better life. What I want to know is
this: is there some low value of p for which Z is better for Sally thanA? If
p is low enough, should we hope for Sally’s sake that the couple ensures
that Sally exists, even though her life would be mediocre? On one view,
the answer must be “yes.” More generally, according to9
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sometimes call it “the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion,” but this
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AThe intrapersonal analogue of the repugnant conclusion will strike
some readers as counterintuitive, given certain background commit-
ments. It is, in particular, hard to square with the common view that it
cannot be worse for a person never to have existed. On that view, no pos-
sible outcome of Z would be better for Sally than any possible outcome
of A, and one possible outcome of A would be better for her than every
possible outcome of Z. That makes it hard to see how Z could be better
for Sally thanA. For we would expect a prospect that is better for Sally to
offer her some probability of a better outcome. But although this diffi-
culty may make the intrapersonal analogue theoretically suspect, it does
not amount to repugnance.
Why is there such a stark difference in repugnance between the re-
pugnant conclusion and its intrapersonal analogue? That is a difficult
and important question, to which I return at the end of the article. For
now, I just want to get the intrapersonal analogue on the table, before I pre-
sent a mere-addition-style argument for it in Section II.B. The intraper-
sonal analogue is important not because it is independently implausible
but because it leads to the (truly) repugnant conclusion—or so I argue in
Section III.
B. Argument for the Intrapersonal Analogue
I now present an argument for the intrapersonal analogue of the repug-
nant conclusion.
Suppose that the couple has a third option, in addition to A and Z.
They can co-inject, along with the sperm, some other material that
would guarantee Sally’s existence. But this prospect (A 1) would have
different effects on Sally’s well-being depending on which state obtains.
If state 1 obtains, A 1 would make Sally’s life wonderful (level a 1)—
considerably better than the life she might have in A. If state 2 obtains,
A 1 would make her life mediocre (level z –)—considerably worse than
the life she would have in Z, but still worth living. The couple’s options
are depicted in table 3.
Like the mere addition paradox, the argument has two steps. First,
A 1 seems better for Sally than A, for any (nonzero) value of p. More
generally, according tocreati
Ryber
to acc
ll use The Probable Addition Principle: For any prospects X and Y, and
any person S who might exist in those prospects: if, in every state of
the world in which S would exist inY, S would be better off inX, and
if, in every other state of the world, S’s life would be worth living inX,
then X is better for S than Y.
on Obligation,” in The Repugnant Conclusion: Essays on Population Ethics, ed. Jesper
g and Torbjörn Tännsjö (Dordrecht: Springer, 2004), 99–128, 110–11, would appear
ept it.
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AThe judgment thatA1 is better for Sally thanA can be supported by the
following argument. A 1 would be better for Sally in one state of the
world. And there is no state in which A 1 would be worse for her. For
it cannot be worse for a person to exist with a life worth living than never
to have existed. But if a prospect yields a better outcome for a person in
some state of the world and a worse outcome for her in no state of the
world, then that prospect must be better for her. So A 1 must be better
for Sally than A. I reject this argument in Section IV.B, but I hope it pro-
vides some prima facie motivation for the principle. I give another argu-
ment for it in Section VII.12
Second, Z seems better for Sally than A1, for some (very small) p.
Suppose, for example, that p is one in a googolplex. And recall that z –,
although worth living, is considerably worse than z. Sally’s life at z –might,
for example, contain a nonnegligible amount of discomfort sprinkled
throughout her otherwise painless but drab life. Under such conditions,
it would be unreasonably reckless for Sally’s parents to chooseA1 rather
than Z. A one-in-a-googolplex chance of a wonderful life is simply not
worth nearly certain pain. More generally, according to1
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any probability less than or equal to p, exist at level x, and would oth-
erwise exist at level y–.This principle is a bit of a mouthful, but only because it is so weak. It says
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Asure thing of the better mediocre life would be better than a gamble that
might, with arbitrarily small probability, yield the very good life but would,
with near certainty, yield the worsemediocre life. This seems tomebeyond
serious doubt.
By the probable addition principle, A 1 is better for Sally than A,
for any p. By minimal prudence, Z is better for her thanA1, for some p.
And betterness for Sally is transitive. So Z must be better for Sally thanA,
for some p. More generally, the probable addition principle and minimal
prudence together imply the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion, given
the transitivity of betterness for a person. Call this the probable addition ar-
gument.
This argument is not particularly paradoxical—at least, by itself. Its
conclusion, as I have emphasized, is not repugnant. I fear, however, that
we must accept the repugnant conclusion if we accept its intrapersonal
analogue. I justify that fear in Section III. After that, I return to the prob-
able addition argument, focusing mostly on the probable addition prin-
ciple, which I take to be the least plausible premise in the argument.
III. FROM INTRAPERSONAL TO INTERPERSONAL REPUGNANCE
In this section, I explain how the repugnant conclusion can be derived
from its intrapersonal analogue. The strategy, very roughly, is to consider
choices between prospects like Sally’s Z and A, but involving many peo-
ple. For concreteness, I focus on a highly simplified example, but I ex-
plain, after giving the argument, how it is easily generalized.
Start by assuming the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion. It will
help to assume a particular instance of it. To keep our numbers small,
suppose (unrealistically) that the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion is
witnessed by p 5 13, that is, a one-in-three chance of existing with an a
life is worse for a person than certainly existing with a z life. Obviously
this value of p is too large to be plausible, but its particular value is arbi-
trary for present purposes; it will not affect the argument.
Now consider the outcomes in table 4. In A0, there is just a single
person—Ann—whose life is wonderful. In Z, there are three people—
Bob, Cat, and Dan—whose lives are mediocre. We are assuming that a
prospect that guarantees level z is better for each of these people thanThis c
ll use subject to UTABLE 4
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Aa prospect in which they each have a one-in-three chance of existing at
level a. That is our instance of the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion. I
claim that, on this assumption, Z must be better than A0. More generally,
given the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion, we must accept the inter-
personal repugnant conclusion. The argument for this claim has four
steps.
A. Impartiality
Consider the outcomes in table 5. In each of A0 through A3, a single per-
son is at level a. But it’s a different person in each outcome. Each person
in A1 through A3 is selected from the larger population in Z.
I claim that all of these outcomes are equally good. More generally,
according to1
in thi
bution
that m
1
istoteli
ll use The Same-Number Equality Claim: Any two outcomes containing
the same number of people, all at the same level of well-being, are
equally good.13I know of no plausible population axiology that violates the same-number
equality claim. It requires impartiality between different possible people,
but only when everyone is equally well off. It says nothing about trade-
offs, for example, between people who already exist and people whose
existence depends on what we do. The principle is compatible with a wide
range of views about such trade-offs.
How could one reject the same-number equality claim? It would be
absurd to suggest that some of the outcomes in table 5 are better than
others. The only alternative to their being equally good would seem to
be that they are incommensurable. But if these outcomes were incom-
mensurable, then improving or worsening one of them might not make
it better or worse than the others. Raz calls this the “mark of incommen-
surability.”14 Intuitively, though, if we improved or worsened one of these
outcomes by increasing or decreasing the well-being of its sole member,
that would make it strictly better or worse than the others. For example,
if A0 were better for Ann than A1 is for Bob, then A0 would be better than
A1. That is hard to explain, unless the outcomes are equally good. More
generally, rejecting the same-number equality claim would make it hard
to explain why it would be better if better lives were lived, even if by dif-
ferent people.3. Recall (from Sec. I) that we are assuming other things to be equal. The principles
s section are thus restricted to the goodness of outcomes with respect to their distri-
s of well-being. They should not be taken to presuppose that welfare is the only thing
atters.
4. Joseph Raz, “Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries,” Proceedings of the Ar-
an Society 86 (1985): 117–34, 121.
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AB. Rationality
Consider the prospects in table 6. There are three equiprobable states of
the world. ProspectA guarantees the same outcome, A0, no matter what.
Prospect A* instead rotates between each of A1, ... , A3 from table 5, as-
signing an equal probability to each.
I claim thatA andA* are equally good, given that outcomes A0, ... ,A3
are equally good. This follows from a more general principle, whose for-
mulation involves some new terminology. Say that a prospect is egalitar-
ian just in case (i) in all of its possible outcomes, everyone who ever exists
is equally well off, and (ii) every person who might exist in that prospect
has an equal probability of existing, at the same welfare levels, in that
prospect.15 A and A* are egalitarian prospects, in that sense. According
to1
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ll use Stochastic Indifference for Equal Risk: For any egalitarian pros-
pectsX and Y, if every possible outcome ofX and every possible out-
come of Y are equally good, then X and Y are equally good.Every possible outcome ofA and every possible outcome ofA* are equally
good, by the same-number equality claim. And these prospects are egali-
tarian. So, by stochastic indifference for equal risk, they are equally good.
This stochastic indifference principle is, I think, a minimal condi-
tion of social rationality. Rationality requires us to be indifferent be-
tween prospects that guarantee equally good outcomes—at least, when
there is no risk of unfairness.165. The term
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ALet me summarize the argument so far.A andA* are equally good,
because they are egalitarian prospects that guarantee equally good out-
comes. They guarantee equally good outcomes because, in all of their
possible outcomes, the same number of people would exist, all at the
same level of well-being. This result is important for the following rea-
son: since A and A* are equally good, anything better than A* must be
better thanA. We can therefore compare any prospect withA by compar-
ing it to A*. We do that in the third step of the argument.
C. Benevolence
Consider the prospects in table 7. We have already seen A*. Prospect Z
guarantees outcome Z, in which all three people live mediocre lives.
Each person in A* exists with probability one-third. And recall that we
have assumed the following instance of the intrapersonal repugnant
conclusion: a prospect of existing at level a with probability one-third
is worse for each person than a prospect that guarantees a life at level z.
On this assumption, Z is better than A* for each of Bob, Cat, and Dan—
that is, for everyone who might exist in either prospect. I claim that, on
this assumption, Z must be better than A*. More generally,1
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ll use Weak Pareto for Equal Risk: For any egalitarian prospects X and
Y, if X is better than Y for each person who might exist in either
prospect, then X is better than Y.17I regard this principle as a minimal condition of benevolence under un-
certainty. We ought to prefer prospects that are better for everyone—at
least, when there is no risk of unfairness.7. The fixe
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AAlthough this Pareto principle is very plausible, it is probably more
controversial than the previous two principles. So I will say more in its
defense, before explaining how the argument concludes in Section III.D.
I offer an inductive argument for this Pareto principle. Take any
prospects X and Y in which only a single person might exist. Suppose
thatX is better than Y for that person. Then, intuitively,Xmust be better
than Y.18 For if some prospect is better for a person, then one ought to
prefer that prospect for that person’s sake. And if one ought to prefer
some prospect for the sake of the only person who might exist, then,
from an impartial perspective, one ought to prefer that prospect. This is
just to say that our Pareto principle is true for all prospects in which only
a single person might exist. This claim will serve as the base case in an in-
ductive argument.
For the inductive step, consider any egalitarian prospectsX andY in
which any number n of people might exist. For any such X and Y, let X 0
and Y0 be prospects just like X and Y, but in which some additional
(n 1 1)th person might exist, in a way that preserves the prospects’ per-
fect equality. Plausibly, if the fact thatX is better thanY for all of the n peo-
ple would be sufficient tomakeX better thanY (more generally, if our Pa-
reto principle holds when there are n epistemically possible people), then
the fact that X0 is better than Y0 for all of the n1 1 people should be suf-
ficient to make X 0 better than Y0 (more generally, then the principle
should hold when there are n 1 1 epistemically possible people). For
the only difference between these pairs of prospects is the possible exis-
tence of one more person. And, by the claim of the previous paragraph,
the fact that X0 is better for her would make X 0 better if she were the onlyTABLE 7
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Aone whomight exist. So, ifX 0 is not better thanY0 despite being better for
everyone, this should be for some reason having to do with some relation
between the (n1 1)th person and the others. It would otherwise be hard
to see how her possible existence would preventX 0 from being better than
Y 0. But what relation is the culprit? If there were any risk of inequality, we
could blame the relational fact that some might be worse off than others,
through no fault of their own. But there is no such risk. The prospects are
egalitarian. I therefore find it hard to see why the principle should be true
for n but not for n 1 1.
I therefore believe that, for any natural number n, if weak Pareto
holds for egalitarian prospects in which each of n people might exist,
then it holds for egalitarian prospects in which each of n 1 1 people
might exist. And I have argued that the principle holds when n 5 1.
So, by induction, the principle holds for any n ≥ 1. This inductive argu-
ment shows that rejecting the principle would require us to think either
that it fails even when only a single person might exist or that the differ-
ence between its true and false instances lies in the addition of only a sin-
gle possible person, whose existence is certain not to generate a trade-off
between different people’s interests. Neither of these thoughts seems to
me very plausible.
I do not pretend that this argument is decisive. If we are convinced
that the repugnant conclusion is false, but that its intrapersonal ana-
logue is true, then rejecting our Pareto principle might be our least bad
option. But the option seems to me quite bad. I return to this possibility
at the end of the article. Suppose, for now, that we accept weak Pareto for
equal risk.
D. Repugnance
In order to derive the repugnant conclusion, we technically need one fi-
nal principle. This principle concerns riskless prospects (i.e., prospects
that guarantee the same outcome in every state) such as Z and A, which
guarantee Z and A, respectively, no matter what. According to1
appea
about
claim
ample
suffic
ll use Certainty Equivalence: For any riskless prospects X and Y, which
guarantee outcomes X and Y, respectively, X is better than Y just
in case X is better than Y.199. This principle may seem too obvious to be worth stating. Some readers, however,
r to deny it. One associate editor of Ethics, for example, insists that no conclusions
the goodness of outcomes—such as the repugnant conclusion—can be drawn from
s about the goodness of prospects. Certainty equivalence seems to me a counterex-
to this claim. But even if certainty equivalence is (somehow) rejected, it would seem
iently repugnant to conclude that prospect Z is better than prospect A.
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AThe better of two riskless prospects is the one with the better outcome.
With this indubitable principle on the table, we can now wrap up the ar-
gument to the repugnant conclusion.
If Z is better for each person than A*, then Z must be better than
A*, by weak Pareto for equal risk. And we are assuming, as an instance of
the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion, that Z is indeed better for each
person than A*. So Zmust be better than A*. And, as we saw at the end
of Section III.B, anything better than A* must also be better than A, by
the same-number equality claim and stochastic indifference for equal
risk. So Zmust be better thanA. But Z guarantees outcome Z no matter
what, and A guarantees outcome A no matter what. So, by certainty
equivalence, Z is better than A just in case Z is better than A. Therefore,
Z must be better than A. That is an instance of the repugnant conclu-
sion.
That is just an instance, obtained from an unrealistic instance of the
intrapersonal analogue. But the argument is easily generalized. Assume
the intrapersonal analogue of the repugnant conclusion. Take any num-
ber k of wonderful lives at level a. We can show there to be some number
n of mediocre lives at level z whose existence would be better. Simply let
n ≥ kp, where p satisfies the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion. Then
consider three prospects, again called A, Z, and A*: A guarantees a
fixed population of k wonderful lives, Z guarantees a fixed population
of nmediocre lives, andA* assigns an equal probability to every possible
k-sized population of people, all living wonderful lives, selected from the
larger population of n people. Each person’s probability of existence in
A* is kn.20 And kn ≤ p, where p (by hypothesis) satisfies the intrapersonal
repugnant conclusion. So Z is better for each person than A*. So, by
weak Pareto for equal risk,Z is better thanA*. And, by the same-number
equality claim and stochastic indifference for equal risk, A* and A are
equally good. Therefore,Z is better thanA. So, by certainty equivalence,
the guaranteed outcome of Z must be better than the guaranteed out-
come of A. That seems repugnant.
We have just seen how the repugnant conclusion can be derived
from its intrapersonal analogue, given minimal conditions of impartial-
ity (the same-number equality claim), rationality (stochastic indifference
for equal risk), and benevolence (weak Pareto for equal risk). And we
saw, in Section II, a seemingly good argument for the intrapersonal an-
alogue: the probable addition argument. Now we have a puzzle.20. Proof: The number of equiprobable outcomes in A* is the number of possible
k-sized combinations selected from a group of n people: n !k !ðn2kÞ !. Each person exists
in ðn21Þ !ðk21Þ !ððn21Þ2ðk21ÞÞ ! of those outcomes. So each person’s probability of existence is
ðn21Þ !
ðk21Þ !ððn21Þ2ðk21ÞÞ ! n !k !ðn2kÞ ! 5 ðn21Þ !n ! : k !ðn2kÞ !ðk21Þ !ðn212k11Þ ! 5 ðn21Þðn22Þ⋯ 21nðn21Þðn22Þ⋯ 21 : kðk21Þðk22Þ⋯ 21ðk21Þðk22Þ⋯ 21 5 kn.
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AI myself find the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion, as well as the
premises of the probable addition argument, far less compelling than
the argument of this section. I therefore suspect that the puzzle should
be resolved at the intrapersonal level. So, in the rest of the article, I ask
how the probable addition argument might be resisted.
IV. THE VALUE OF EXISTENCE
I begin this section by rejecting some responses to the probable addition
argument based on existing views in population ethics. I then identify
what I take to be the central issue in responding to the argument: the
prudential value of a person’s existence.
A. Intrapersonal Perfectionism and the Personal Critical Level
The probable addition argument would perhaps be uninteresting if ev-
ery response to the mere addition paradox could be extended, in some
straightforward and plausible way, to the intrapersonal case. But that is
not so. Consider two examples.
First, consider the view that Parfit calls perfectionism: “Even if some
change brings a great net benefit to those who are affected, it is a change
for the worse if it involves the loss of one of the best things in life.”21 This
view resolves the mere addition paradox (depicted in table 1) by denying
that Z is better than A1, given the plausible assumption that Z contains
fewer (perhaps none) of the best things in life.
Does Parfit’s perfectionism have a plausible intrapersonal ana-
logue? The analogous view would seem to be the following: even if some
prospect would, in expectation, bring a great net benefit to a person, it is
worse for her if it lowers her probability of enjoying the best things in
life. This view responds to the probable addition argument (concerning
the prospects in table 3) by denying that Z is better for Sally than A 1,
however improbable state 1 is. But this view seems to me absurd. It is ir-
rational to prefer prospects that will almost certainly be worse for us, in
the pursuit of arbitrarily small chances of enjoying the best things in life.
And it is manifestly unreasonable to choose such prospects on behalf of
others. Perfectionism is simply not a plausible view of the goodness of
individual prospects.
More generally, I find it much less plausible to deny that Z is better
for Sally than A 1 in the intrapersonal case than to deny the analogous
step in the interpersonal case. We can perhaps live with an inegalitarian,
nonutilitarian axiology. We cannot, I think, live with an absurdly reckless
decision theory.21. Parfit, “Overpopulation,” 163.
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AFor a second example, consider critical-level views.22 Critical-level
theorists argue that there is a fixed, positive “critical level” of well-being
below which a person’s existence makes the world worse, even though
her life is worth living. This kind of view resolves the mere addition par-
adox by denying that A 1 is better than A, assuming that the mediocre
lives in A 1 fall below the critical level.
Do critical-level views have a plausible analogue in the intrapersonal
case? According to a personal critical-level view, there is some fixed, pos-
itive welfare level below which a person’s existence is worse for her than
her nonexistence. This view would respond to the probable addition ar-
gument by denying thatA1must be better for Sally thanA. For if Sally’s
mediocre life in A 1 falls below that level, and if she’d be sufficiently
likely to lead such a life, A 1 may very well be worse for Sally than A.
The personal critical-level view is dubiously coherent. For if some
life were worse than nonexistence, then in what sense would its value
be positive? We would expect our scale of well-being to be normalized in
such a way that any life worse than nonexistence is assigned a negative
value. If not, then we must have some other way of defining a neutral level
of well-being, which does not involve comparisons with nonexistence. A
few such methods have been proposed in the literature. But all of them,
to my knowledge, are motivated primarily by the alleged incoherence
of comparing lives with nonexistence. And the most plausible methods
along these lines do not combine easily with the idea of a personal critical
level.
Consider, for example, an elegant method proposed by Blackorby,
Bossert, and Donaldson.23 They imagine good and bad lives getting
shorter and shorter and suggest that, as length of life gets arbitrarily
close to zero, well-being approaches the same value. The value to which
these shortenings converge is that of a neutral life, which is the zero level
on their scale of well-being. Lives above this zero level are worth living;
lives below it are not. But now suppose we introduce a personal critical
level c, and that this level is set above zero in order to avoid the intraper-
sonal repugnant conclusion. Consider some personwhose life is at level c.
We are now supposed to think that it would be worse for this person if
her life were shortened to a length arbitrarily close to zero, but that it
would be better for her if her length of life actually were zero. This dis-
continuity seems to me extremely unnatural.22. John Broome, Weighing Lives (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Charles
Blackorby, Walter Bossert, and David Donaldson, Population Issues in Social Choice Theory,
Welfare Economics, and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
23. Blackorby, Bossert, and Donaldson, Population Issues, 25.
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AWe have considered the most obvious intrapersonal analogues of two
views in population ethics. The intrapersonal analogue of perfectionism
seems absurd. The intrapersonal analogue of the critical-level view seems
incoherent. I donot claim that wemust therefore reject those views in pop-
ulation ethics. But their proponents need some other way of rejecting the
probable addition argument.
B. Dominance, Noncomparativism, and Pseudodominance
Of the two views just considered, the personal critical-level view seems to
me closer to being on the right track. It rejects the least plausible premise
in the argument for the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion: the proba-
ble addition principle (Sec. II.B). This principle says that A 1 must be
better for Sally than A because, in every state in which she would exist
in A, she would be even better off in A 1, and in every other state, her
life in A1 would be worth living. This principle is not nearly as compel-
ling as the other premises in the argument.
To reject the probable addition principle, we must deny that a me-
diocre life is better for a person than her nonexistence. For suppose that
a mediocre life is better for a person than her nonexistence. This would
lead quickly to the probable addition principle, by2
sues 1
where
ll use Personal Statewise Dominance: If the outcome of one prospect is
better for a person than the outcome of another prospect in every
state of the world, then the one prospect is better for her than the
other.If a mediocre life were better for Sally than her nonexistence, then A 1
would be better for Sally than A in every state of the world. So, by per-
sonal statewise dominance, A 1 would be better for her.
It would not help to claim that a mediocre life is just as good as, but
not better than, nonexistence. For some mediocre lives are better than
others. If some mediocre life is just as good as nonexistence, then any
slightly better—but still mediocre—life would be better than nonexis-
tence. So we could still obtain the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion.
So, to reject the probable addition principle, we must deny that a
mediocre life is better than, or even as good as, nonexistence. The per-
sonal critical-level view does this, but in a dubiously coherent way: by
claiming that a mediocre life is worse than nonexistence, despite being
worth living. The remaining option is to deny that such a life is even com-
parable to nonexistence.24 And that is what the most influential critical-
level theorists (Broome and Blackorby et al.) in fact believe. They accept4. Wlodek Rabinowicz, “Broome and the Intuition of Neutrality,” Philosophical Is-
9 (2009): 389–411, suggests instead that certain lives are on a par with nonexistence,
parity is a value relation that implies comparability but rules out the standard rela-
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All use Noncomparativism: One outcome is better for a person than an-
other outcome only if the person exists in both outcomes.The most influential argument for noncomparativism goes like this.25 If
it is better for a person to exist than never to have existed, then it would
be worse for her if she never existed than if she did. But if she never ex-
isted, then there would be no “her” for whom that could have been worse.
Thus, if a person does not exist in one of two outcomes, then neither out-
come can be better for her than the other. Call this the metaphysical argu-
ment. I return to it in Section V.C.
Can noncomparativists reject the probable addition principle? It
might seem that they cannot. For we might seem able to strengthen our
statewise dominance principle toStatewise Pseudodominance: If the outcome of one prospect is
better for a person than the outcome of another prospect in some
state of the world, and is no worse for her in any state of the world,
then the one prospect is better for her than the other.This principle does, given noncomparativism, imply the probable addi-
tion principle. For if A 1’s outcome is better for Sally than A’s in every
state in which she would exist in A, and gives her a life worth living in
every other state, then A 1’s outcome is better for her in some state and
worse for her in no state. (This was the argument given in Sec. II.B.)
Noncomparativists, however, should reject statewise pseudodom-
inance. It leads to betterness cycles. Suppose, for example, that Sally’s
prospects are as depicted in table 8. (For concreteness, I represent wel-
fare levels with numbers, but this representation is inessential to the ar-
gument.)
In table 8, B’s outcome is better for Sally thanA’s in state 2 and (by
noncomparativism) no worse for her in any other state. So, by statewise
pseudodominance, B is better for her thanA. By the same reasoning, C is
better for her than B, and A is better for her than C. That violates the
acyclicity of better for Sally than. So statewise pseudodominance must be
rejected (at least, by noncomparativists).
Noncomparativists are therefore not forced to accept the probable
addition principle, which is the least plausible premise in the probable5. John Broome, Ethics Out of Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
, 168.
of betterness, worseness, and equal goodness; see Ruth Chang, “The Possibility of Par-
thics 112 (2002): 659–88. On Rabinowicz’s view, however, other lives (above some
of parity) are better than nonexistence, and that is enough to obtain a version of
trapersonal (and therefore interpersonal) repugnant conclusion: just replace “medi-
with “barely better than nonexistence.”
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Aaddition argument. And their view is supported by the metaphysical ar-
gument, which many find compelling. So noncomparativists seem well
equipped to solve our puzzle. But it remains to be seen whether they can
plausibly explain why the probable addition principle is false. I discuss this
question in Sections V and VI.
V. NONCOMPARATIVIST RESTRICTIONS
Noncomparativism imposes a restriction on the prudential value of out-
comes. It is not obvious what noncomparativists should say about the
prudential value of prospects—in particular, about prospects like A and
A 1.
I consider two answers: in this section, that A and A1 are not even
comparable for Sally; in Section VI, that A 1 is worse for Sally than A.
A. The Certain-Existence Restriction
The simplest extension of noncomparativism to prospects is2
Dona
Choice
pects
ll use The Certain-Existence Restriction: One prospect is better for a
person than another only if she would certainly exist in both pros-
pects.26The view can be motivated as follows. A prospect’s value for a person, we
might think, is just its expected value for her—that is, the probability-
weighted average of its outcomes’ values for her. And, noncomparativists
should think, outcomes in which a person does not exist have no value—
as opposed to a value of zero—for her. So a prospect in which a person
might not exist has no expected value for her. For the expectation of a
variable over possible outcomes requires the variable to have a value in6. This see
ldson, “Var
and Welfare
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Aall of those outcomes. So prospects in which a person might not exist
have no value for that person. So they cannot have greater or lesser value
for her, and therefore cannot be better or worse for her, than any other
prospects.
The certain-existence restriction provides a simple response to the
probable addition argument: A 1 cannot be better for Sally than A, be-
cause Sally might not exist in A. But the certain-existence restriction
seems false. Consider table 9, in which we are nearly certain that state 1
obtains, in which case Sally exists.
Our uncertainty in table 9 might be highly general (e.g., about the
existence of other minds or whether one is a brain in a vat) or more spe-
cific to Sally in particular (e.g., whether her mother’s nearly completed
pregnancy will come to term, or whether she has developed enough to
be conscious). It seems clear to me that A is better for Sally than B even
in the presence of such uncertainty. The mere epistemic possibility of
other minds’ nonexistence, or of a nearly completed pregnancy not
coming to term, should not make it impossible to promote the prospec-
tive good of our loved ones or of our future children. We ought to prefer
A for Sally’s sake.
This judgment can be supported by the following reasoning. Pros-
pects that share outcomes in some states of the world should be com-
pared by simply comparing the outcomes in which they differ. More pre-
cisely, if the outcome of one prospect is better for a person than the
outcome of another prospect in some state of the world, and if those
prospects assign the very same outcomes to every other state of the
world, then the one prospect is better for her than the other. This is true
of A and B in table 9: A’s outcome is better for Sally than B’s in state 1,
and they share the same outcome—Sally’s nonexistence—in state 2. A
should therefore be better for Sally than B, in violation of the certain-
existence restriction.
Noncomparativists might resist the claim that A is better for Sally
than B. For, after all, Sally might not even exist! So there might be no
such person as Sally for whomA could be better. I will soon, in Section V.C,This c
ll use subject to UTABLE 9
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Areject the metaphysical argument for noncomparativism, on which this
response seems to rest. But, in themeantime, we can dismiss the response
for a different reason. We can simply stipulate that Sally does in fact exist,
but that this fact is unknown to the agent. (Recall that our probabilities
are just the agent’s rational credences.) This stipulation makes the re-
sponse unpersuasive. For it is hard to see why themere epistemic possibil-
ity for some agent of Sally’s nonexistence—due to the agent’s uncertainty
about the existence of other minds, or of the status of some pregnancy—
should make it impossible, for metaphysical reasons, for any prospects
available to this agent to be better or worse for Sally.
I therefore reject the certain-existence restriction.
B. The Same-State Restriction
Noncomparativists might accommodate the intuitive judgment about
table 9 by adopting a weaker restriction. According toll use The Same-State Restriction: One prospect is better for a person
than another only if the person would exist in the same states of
the world regardless of which prospect is chosen.The same-state restriction might be motivated as follows. Define an event
as a subset of the set of states. Suppose that Sally exists in the same states
in both of two prospects. Then there is some event conditional on which
every outcome of both prospects has some value for Sally. So we need not
worry about an undefined expected value if that event obtains. And, if
that event does not obtain, neither prospect would have any value for
Sally. Noncomparativists might think that one prospect is better for a
person than another prospect just in case there is some event E such that
(1) conditional on E, the one prospect has greater expected value for
her than the other prospect, and (2) conditional on :E, no outcome
of either prospect has any value for her. This implies the same-state re-
striction because if a person exists in some state in one prospect but
not in another, then there is no event that satisfies both (1) and (2).
The same-state restriction would allow noncomparativists to reject
the probable addition principle, while accommodating the right result
in table 9. But consider table 10. Here, A seems clearly better for Sally
than B0. This violates the same-state restriction because there are some
unlikely states in which Sally’s existence depends on which prospect is
chosen. Notice, moreover, that it would be strange to admit thatA is bet-
ter for Sally than B in table 9 but to deny that A is better for her than B0
in table 10. For, surely, if A is better for Sally than B in table 9, then A is
better for Sally than B in table 10: in both cases, there is some 0.99-
probability event conditional on which Sally would be much better off
in A than in B, and she has no probability of existing otherwise. But ifThis content downloaded from 192.236.036.029 on December 23, 2018 03:38:34 AM
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AA is better for Sally than B in table 10, then it would be strange to deny
that A is better for Sally than B0. This is because B0 can be obtained by
rearranging the outcomes of B. These two prospects are permutations of
each other: they assign the same outcomes to states of the same proba-
bility. And, intuitively, any two prospects that are permutations of each
other are equally good for a person. Therefore, B0 and Bmust be equally
good for Sally. So, ifA is better for Sally than B in table 9, thenAmust be
better for her than B0 in table 10—contrary to the same-state restriction.
C. The Metaphysical Argument
There are other possible noncomparativist restrictions (e.g., a same--
probability restriction) which face similar counterexamples. But we have
seen enough to notice a deeper problem for noncomparativists—at
least, those noncomparativists who are motivated by the metaphysical ar-
gument.
The metaphysical argument says that an outcome X is better for a
person than an alternative Y only if, were Y to obtain, Y would be worse
for her than X, and that something can be worse for a person only if she
exists. Presumably, if this is true for outcomes, then something similar
must hold for prospects. (Otherwise, we would not expect the argument
to support a restriction on the prudential value of prospects incompati-
ble with the probable addition principle.) The similar claim for pros-
pects would seem to be that a prospect X is better for a person than
an alternative Y only if, were Y chosen, Y would—or, at least, could—
be worse for her than X.27 But this claim can be ruled out by the princi-
ples we advanced against the certain-existence and same-state restric-27. Whe
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Ations. Consider table 11.28 Here, C is better for Sally than D. This follows
from our reasoning against the certain-existence restriction: we compare
prospects that share outcomes by comparing the outcomes in which they
differ. C yields a better outcome for Sally thanD in the only state in which
they differ. And D0 is just as good for Sally as D, because they assign the
same outcomes to states of the same probability. Cmust therefore be bet-
ter for Sally than D0.
But this conclusion—that C is better for Sally than D0—is hard to
square with the metaphysical argument. For suppose that C is chosen. Ei-
ther state 1 obtains or state 2 obtains. If state 1 obtains, then, hadD0 been
chosen, there would have been no Sally for whom that could have been
worse. If state 2 obtains, then there is no Sally for whom C could be bet-
ter. So, whichever state obtains, the metaphysical argument predicts a
barrier—either Sally’s actual nonexistence, or her counterfactual nonex-
istence—to C’s being better for Sally thanD0. But C is better for Sally than
D0. Choosing D0 would clearly be acting against Sally’s interests. So the
metaphysical argument cannot be sound.29
This, of course, does not show that it can be better for a person to
exist than not to exist. Nor does it diagnose the error in the metaphysical
argument. I claim only that the argument is unsound. The conclusion
that C is better for Sally than D0 seems to me more compelling than
the premises of the metaphysical argument, which others have found in-
dependent reason to reject. Some argue, for example, that so long as a
person does exist, outcomes can be better or worse for her, even if she
wouldn’t have existed had those outcomes obtained.30 Others argue that
things can be better or worse for people who never exist.31 We need not
choose between these options here.28. A case of this kind is also considered by Teruji Thomas, “Topics in Population
Ethics” (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2016), chap. 3, although he draws a different
lesson from it than I do.
29. An anonymous reviewer finds this argument objectionably similar to unsound argu-
ments for the moral equivalence of anonymous and nonanonymous Pareto improvements;
see, e.g., F. M. Kamm,Morality, Mortality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1:chap. 5.
Such arguments appeal to a permutation-invariance principle for welfare distributions, much
like my permutation-invariance principle for individual prospects. The principle for distri-
butions might be rejected on the grounds that it eliminates morally relevant facts about the
good of particular individuals. But the analogous principle for individual prospects is not sim-
ilarly objectionable. The particular state in which an outcome occurs does not seem pruden-
tially significant in anything like the way in which the identities of particular people might
seem morally significant (e.g., owing to the separateness of persons).
30. Gustaf Arrhenius and Wlodek Rabinowicz, “The Value of Existence,” in The Oxford
Handbook of Value Theory, ed. Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 424–43.
31. M. A. Roberts, “A New Way of Doing the Best That We Can: Person-Based Conse-
quentialism and the Equality Problem,” Ethics 112 (2002): 315–50; Marc Fleurbaey and
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AI have argued that the metaphysical argument for noncomparativ-
ism is unsound. Of course, there may be other arguments for noncom-
parativism. My challenge to such noncomparativists is to (a) provide an
argument for their view that is not similarly undermined by the case of
table 11, while still (b) restricting the goodness of uncertain prospects in
a plausible way that rules out the probable addition principle. Mean-
while, in Section VI, I consider a different way of rejecting the probable
addition principle.
VI. THE CONDITIONAL-ON-EXISTENCE VIEW
We have considered three ways in which A 1 might compare to A. Ac-
cording to the probable addition principle, A 1 is better for Sally than
A. This leads to the repugnant conclusion via its intrapersonal analogue.
According to the noncomparativist restrictions considered in Section V,
A 1 is neither better nor worse for Sally than A. No such extensions
seem plausible. MightA1 be worse for Sally thanA? We already rejected
one view on which that is so: the personal critical-level view. But there is
another view, which is more plausible.
A. Conditional Expectations and Noncomparativism
We considered, in Section V.B, the possibility of comparing prospects by
comparing their expected values for a person conditional on the event
(if there is one) in which the person would exist no matter which pros-
pect is chosen. This amounts to ignoring the outcomes in which a per-
son might not exist—hence the same-state restriction. But instead of
conditionalizing on an event and then comparing the resulting expectedAlex Voorhoeve,
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Avalues, we could instead assign a value to each prospect taken separately by
conditionalizing on a person’s existence in that prospect. Let me explain.
Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey utilize the notion of a person’s expected
well-being conditional on her existence in a prospect—for short, her
conditional expected well-being.32 Whereas a person’s unconditional ex-
pected well-being in a prospect is the probability-weighted average of her
welfare levels in each of its outcomes, her conditional expected well-
being is obtained by weighting each outcome instead by its conditional
probability on the hypothesis that she exists. Equivalently, it is her un-
conditional expected well-being divided by her probability of existence.
Informally, we simply ignore all of a prospect’s outcomes in which the
person does not exist and renormalize so that the probabilities of the re-
maining outcomes sum to 1. According to3
ent pu
for a
view c
to con
for Po
3
Choice
151–7
ll use The Conditional-on-Existence View: One prospect is better for a
person than another prospect just in case the one offers her greater
conditional expected well-being than the other.This view conflicts with the probable addition principle. Regarding our
initial puzzle (table 3), the conditional-on-existence view implies that
A 1 is worse for Sally than A, for some values of p. Sally’s conditional
expected well-being in A is a; her conditional expected well-being in
A 1 approaches z – as p approaches zero. The conditional-on-existence
view thus implies that A 1 may be worse for Sally than A without claim-
ing, with the personal critical-level view, that a life worth living can be
worse than nonexistence.
Indeed, the conditional-on-existence view meshes quite nicely with
noncomparativism, which the rejection of the probable addition princi-
ple appears to require. This is noted by Harsanyi in his 1977 correspon-
dence with Ng. Harsanyi argues that if he were uncertain about his own
existence from behind the veil of ignorance, “the only rational decision
rule for me would be to maximize the conditional expectation of my util-
ity function on the condition that I would in fact exist. . . . This is so be-
cause only existing people can have real utility levels since they are the
only ones able to enjoy objects with a positive utility, suffer from objects
with a negative utility, and feel indifferent to objects with zero utility.”332. Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, “Priority or Equality.” They put the idea to quite differ-
rposes than ours. Indeed, they define positive welfare levels as those that are better
person than nonexistence—which rules out, by personal statewise dominance, the
onsidered in this section. I reject their view and sketch an alternative that appeals
ditional expectations in a different way in Jacob M. Nebel, “Priority, Not Equality,
ssible People,” Ethics 127 (2017): 896–911.
3. Published in Yew-Kwang Ng’s “Some Broader Issues of Social Choice,” in Social
and Welfare, ed. P. K. Pattanaik and M. Salles (Amsterdam: North Holland 1983),
3, 168.
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AThe conditional-on-existence view seems to reflect this lack of con-
cern for the nonexistent, because it gives no weight to outcomes in
which a person doesn’t exist; they are simply ignored. That is as it should
be, if noncomparativism is true. If a person’s existence isn’t better for
her than her nonexistence, then making her more likely to exist should
not, by itself, make the prospect better for her. Increasing the probability
of a person’s existence may perhaps improve her prospects by making
her more likely to enjoy a better life if she exists. But a mere difference
in her probability of existence should not affect the value of her prospec-
tive existence. So it doesn’t, on the conditional-on-existence view.
The conditional-on-existence view also converges with noncompar-
ativism’s verdicts about riskless prospects. Suppose that some prospect is
certain to bring Sally into existence with a life worth living, and that
some alternative prospect is certain to prevent Sally from coming into
existence. The conditional-on-existence view implies that neither pros-
pect is better for Sally than the other—as noncomparativists would surely
believe. It has this implication because Sally’s conditional expected well-
being is undefined in a prospect in which she has no probability of exis-
tence: the denominator of her conditional expected well-being is zero.
Since a positive value is not greater or less than an undefined value, nei-
ther prospect is better for her than the other.
We have just seen why noncomparativists might find the conditional-
on-existence view attractive. I now want to consider its implications for
population ethics and raise some objections.
B. Asymmetric Comparativism
The conditional-on-existence view has a simple analogue in population
ethics: average utilitarianism. Just as the conditional-on-existence view
values a prospect for a person by dividing her unconditional expected
well-being by her probability of existence, so average utilitarianism val-
ues a population by dividing its total well-being by the number of people
in it.
Because of its resemblance to average utilitarianism, we can expect
the conditional-on-existence view to face problems much like those for
average utilitarianism. And it does. Most obviously, the view has absurd
implications when a person’s conditional expected well-being is nega-
tive.34 Consider table 12. The conditional-on-existence view implies that
–B is better for Sally than –A. But that is absurd: –B offers Sally a cer-
tainly miserable existence, and –A offers her the possibility of being bet-34. Toby Handfield, “Egalitarianism about Expected Utility,” Ethics 128 (2018): 603–
11, makes a similar point against the hybrid view of Voorhoeve and Fleurbaey, although
not in terms of prudential value.
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Ater off or not existing at all. One ought to prefer –A to –B for Sally’s sake,
contrary to the conditional-on-existence view.
This objection is decisive against the conditional-on-existence view
as stated. But itmay be reasonable to restrict the conditional-on-existence
view to prospects in which a person’s conditional expected well-being is
not negative.35 (Call the resulting view the restricted conditional-on-existence
view.) This restriction may seem ad hoc, but it is perhaps justifiable if
there is an asymmetry between good lives and bad lives in terms of how
they compare to nonexistence. According to what we might call asymmet-
ric comparativism, it cannot be better for someone to have a life worth liv-
ing than never to have existed, but it is always worse for someone to have a
miserable life than never to have existed. The possibility of asymmetric
comparativism has been largely overlooked in the literature on the value
of existence.36 I suspect that this is because the main reasons why people
doubt that it can be better for a person to exist appeal to metaphysical
constraints that would, if true, make it impossible for it to be worse for
a person to exist—contrary to asymmetric comparativism. I’ve already ex-
pressedmy skepticism about suchmetaphysical constraints. I think that if
it cannot be better for a person to exist, this must be for more specifically
ethical reasons, which might allow some lives to be worse than nonexis-
tence.
I do not claim here that asymmetric comparativism is true. I hope to
explore the possibility in other work. My claim is merely that if asymmetric
comparativism is true, then it wouldnot be adhoc to restrict the conditional-
on-existence view to prospects in which a person’s conditional expected35. Co
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Awell-being is not negative.37 So the objection from table 12 is not decisive,
unless we can rule out asymmetric comparativism.
Other objections to average utilitarianism would likely generalize
even to the restricted conditional-on-existence view. But suppose we
are unpersuaded by those objections. Interestingly, a new problem arises
from the interaction between the conditional-on-existence view and its
implications for population axiology.
C. Ex Post–Ex Ante Inconsistency
The conditional-on-existence view not only resembles average utilitari-
anism; it can also serve as a foundation for a version of average utilitar-
ianism. Suppose we accept the restricted conditional-on-existence view,
as well as the principles of Section III: the same-number equality claim,
stochastic indifference for equal risk, weak Pareto for equal risk, and cer-
tainty equivalence. We can then derive3
tional
3
itive l
possib
is bett
ciples
ll use The Restricted Average View: For any outcomes X and Y in which
well-being is equally distributed at nonnegative welfare levels x and
y, respectively, X is better than Y if x is greater than y.38Population size, on this view, is simply ignored.
The restricted conditional-on-existence view may now seem espe-
cially promising—at least, if asymmetric comparativism is defensible.
Given the principles of Section III, it yields the restricted average view,
which avoids the repugnant conclusion and perhaps the most devastat-
ing problems for average utilitarianism.
A new problem, however, emerges from this derivation of the re-
stricted average view. Consider the prospects in table 13: there are two
possible individuals, i and j, and four equiprobable states. Both pros-
pects are egalitarian: in every outcome, everyone who exists is equally
well off, and each person has an equal probability of existing at each
of the same welfare levels. All welfare levels are positive, so we can set
aside problems stemming from negative welfare levels.
According to the restricted conditional-on-existence view, A is bet-
ter than B for both i and j, because A offers each person a greater non-
negative conditional expectation of well-being. By weak Pareto for equal7. I say “not negative,” rather than “positive,” to include cases in which one’s condi-
expected well-being is neutral or undefined.
8. Let X contain k people at positive level x, and let Y contain n(≥ k) people at pos-
evel y. Let X guarantee X, Y guarantee Y, and X* assign an equal probability to every
le k-sized population living at level x, selected from the n people in Y. If x > y, thenX*
er for each person than Y, by the conditional-on-existence view. Then apply the prin-
of Sec. III just as in the argument of Sec. III.D.
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Arisk, we should therefore expect A to be better than B, if the restricted
conditional-on-existence view is correct.
Compare, however, the outcomes of A and B, considered state by
state. According to the restricted average view—which follows from the
restricted conditional-on-existence view and the principles of Section III—
A’s outcome is worse than B’s in every state of the world because A guar-
antees a lower nonnegative universal level of well-being. We should there-
fore expect A not to be better than B, by3
of Eco
ll use Minimal Statewise Dominance: For any egalitarian prospects X
and Y, if X assigns a worse outcome than Y to every state of the
world, then X is not better than Y.This principle is significantly weaker than the standard requirement of
statewise dominance, which has been called “the most basic rationality
condition under uncertainty.”39 It is hard to imagine what an adequate
theory of decision under uncertainty would look like without this princi-
ple, and how such a theory could be true. It seems clearly rational—if not
rationally required—to prefer a prospect that guarantees a preferable
outcome, at least when there is no risk of unfairness.
In the case of table 13, the restricted conditional-on-existence view
generates an ex post–ex ante inconsistency: comparing the prospects’
outcomes state by state yields one verdict; comparing the individuals’
prospects person by person yields another. Such inconsistencies are fa-
miliar to egalitarians. But familiar egalitarian explanations do not apply
to this case because both prospects are egalitarian. We seem to lack, in
this case, any familiar reason not to prefer the prospect that is better
for everyone, or the prospect that guarantees a better outcome. This
ex post–ex ante inconsistency seems hard to explain.
Proponents of the restricted conditional-on-existence view might
respond in one of two ways. They might, on the one hand, reject mini-TABLE 13
Ex Post–Ex Ante Inconsistency
State 1
(0.25)
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(0.25)
State 3
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Amal statewise dominance and maintain that A is better than B, despite
guaranteeing a worse outcome. Proponents of the restricted conditional-
on-existence view might try to justify this strategy on the grounds that
choosing B is not justifiable to (because worse for) each person.40 Such
a person-centered approach, however, seems insufficient to rescue the
conditional-on-existence view in this case. For ifA is chosen, we can be cer-
tain that the only person who exists would have fared better under B! Con-
cern for individuals’ interests therefore seems not to unequivocally sup-
port a rejection of minimal statewise dominance in this case.
What if, on the other hand, proponents of the restricted conditional-
on-existence view reject weak Pareto for equal risk anddeny thatA is better
thanB, despite being worse for each person? This seems tome a desperate
strategy. It would, at the very least, make the conditional-on-existence view
significantly less interesting for our purposes. For if we were willing to re-
ject weak Pareto, then we would never have needed to reject the probable
addition principle in the first place; we could have simply accepted the in-
trapersonal analogue of the repugnant conclusion while rejecting the re-
pugnant conclusion’s derivation. In other words, if proponents of the re-
stricted conditional-on-existence view reject our Pareto principle, they
will have solved our puzzle only by appealing to a completely different—
and independently implausible—solution to the very same puzzle. More-
over, weak Pareto for equal risk was needed in our derivation of the re-
stricted average view from the restricted conditional-on-existence view. If
proponents of the restricted conditional-on-existence view jettison this
principle, they would seem to lack any straightforward route to rejecting
the repugnant conclusion, even if they avoid the intrapersonal route to ac-
cepting the repugnant conclusion.
The restricted conditional-on-existence view seems to me signifi-
cantly less plausible than minimal statewise dominance, weak Pareto
for equal risk, and the other principles of Section III. I am therefore in-
clined to reject the conditional-on-existence view, even when restricted
to nonnegative prospects.41
This problem is of independent significance. For the importance of
ex post–ex ante consistency arguably lies at the core of Harsanyi’s case
for utilitarianism. In order to defend his choice of average (as opposed40. For thinking along these lines, see Johann Frick, “Uncertainty and Justifiability to
Each Person,” in Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics, ed. Nir Eyal et al. (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 129–46.
41. In the framework of McCarthy, Mikkola, and Thomas, “Utilitarianism,” the
conditional-on-existence view delivers a view—dubbed veiled average utilitarianism by
Thomas, “Topics in Population Ethics”—that divides expected total welfare by expected pop-
ulation size. Interestingly, this view can recommend prospects that yield worse outcomes in
every state and prospects that are worse for everyone.
This content downloaded from 192.236.036.029 on December 23, 2018 03:38:34 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
340 Ethics January 2019
Ato total) utilitarianism from behind his veil of ignorance, Harsanyi ap-
peals to the conditional-on-existence view. But, as we have just seen, this
appeal to conditional expectations would make Harsanyi’s own view ex
post–ex ante inconsistent.
VII. AN ARGUMENT FOR PROBABLE ADDITION
Those of us who wish to avoid the repugnant conclusion are in a difficult
position. The least plausible premise in our argument to the repugnant
conclusion was the probable addition principle. We have found no plau-
sible way of rejecting that principle. We can reject the probable addition
principle only by denying that a life worth living is better for a person
than nonexistence. But we have seen reason to doubt the most influen-
tial argument for noncomparativism and the most obvious ways of ex-
tending noncomparativism under uncertainty.
This does not, however, mean that the probable addition principle
is true. And we might find comfort in the fact that the obvious argument
for the principle, which appealed to pseudodominance in Section IV.B,
turned out to be unsound. It may therefore seem reasonable to maintain
that the probable addition principle is false, even if we do not know why
it is false.
Unfortunately, there is a better argument for the probable addition
principle—or, rather, for a slightly weaker principle that suffices for the
argument to the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion. The argument has
four steps, all of which concern table 14. In this case, the welfare levels
are again Sally’s: a is any wonderful level, d some positive quantity of well-
being, –z some negative welfare level, y any positive welfare level, and p
and q probabilities.
First, considerA andA0, but ignore state 3—that is, suppose that q5 0.
Most decision theorists would agree that, for any a > 0, there are some
values of d > 0, –z < 0, and 0 < p <1 for whichA0 would be better for Sally
thanA (again, ignoring state 3). That is, there is some benefit that is worth
some chance of a life that is, to some degree, not worth living. This claim
would be violated only by the most radically risk-averse decision theories.
So much the worse, I think, for such theories.
Second, suppose that 0 < q < 1 , and consider A and A0 again. Intu-
itively, if A0 was better for Sally than A for some d, –z, and p when q 5 0,
then it remains so when state 3 has positive probability. After all, the
value of q does not affect the relative probabilities of states 1 and 2 com-
pared to each other—that is, the ratio of (1 – p)(1 – q) to p(1 – q). And it
is the ratio of those probabilities that can justify the trade-off between a
possible gain of d and a possible loss of a 1 z. Since A and A0 share the
very same outcomes in state 3, the probability of this state should intui-
tively not affect which prospect is better for Sally.This content downloaded from 192.236.036.029 on December 23, 2018 03:38:34 AM
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AThird, consider A0 and A 1, but ignore state 1—that is, suppose
that p 5 1. A 1 seems better for Sally than A0, when ignoring state 1,
for any a, d, y, and –z, and any q between 0 and 1. More generally, a pros-
pect in which a person is certain to exist with a life that is certainly worth
living is better for her than any prospect that, conditional on her exis-
tence, makes her life not worth living.
Fourth, suppose that 0 < p < 1, and considerA0 andA1 again. This
introduces the possibility that Sally already exists, no matter what we do,
with a wonderful life that cannot be affected by our choice. Intuitively, if
A 1 was better for Sally than A*0 when ignoring state 1, then it should
remain so when state 1 is possible, for any a, d, y, and –z, and any prob-
abilities p and q between 0 and 1. Since A 1 and A0 share the very same
outcomes in state 1, the probability of this state should not affect which
prospect is better for Sally. It is hard to see how, if we ought to preferA1 to
A0 when p5 1 for Sally’s sake, wemight be permitted not to preferA1 to
A0 for her sake, when these prospects only differ via the introduction of a
possible state in which Sally’s well-being is beyond our control.
Here is what we have shown. For some values of d, –z, and p, A0 is
better for Sally than A, for any a and q. That was the conclusion of steps 1
and 2. And, for any values of a, d, –z, y, p, and q, A 1 is better for Sally
than A0. That was the conclusion of steps 3 and 4. So, for some d, –z,
and p, A 1 is better for Sally than A, for any a, y, and q. Since the values
of –z and p are irrelevant to the comparison ofA andA1 (the value of p
does not affect Sally’s well-being in either prospect, and neither prospect
has any chance of giving Sally level –z), we can state our conclusion as fol-
lows: there is some amount of well-being such that if, in every state in
which someone would exist in A, she’d be better off by that amount in
A 1, and if, in every other state of the world, her life in A 1 would be
worth living, then A 1 is better for Sally than A. This conclusion holds
regardless of the relative probabilities of those states (i.e., for any q). It is
therefore enough to yield the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion, given
minimal prudence: for any values of a and d, theremust be some probabil-
ity q and some mediocre welfare levels y and z, such that a sure thing of z
would be better thanA1. Thus, for some q, a sure thing of z would be bet-
ter than A. That is the intrapersonal repugnant conclusion.ll use subjeTABLE 14
An Argument for Probable Addition
State 1 (1 – p)(1 – q) State 2 (p(1 – q)) State 3 (q)
A a a
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AThis argument shows that rejecting the probable addition principle
is not a simple matter. It is not the kind of principle that we can reason-
ably reject without a compelling explanation for why it is false. In order
to reject the probable addition principle, we would need to know where
and why the argument just given fails.
VIII. CONCLUSION: SPECULATIONS ON REPUGNANCE
The least plausible premise in our argument to the repugnant conclusion
was the probable addition principle. We have found some reason to ac-
cept this principle and no good reason to reject it—other than the fact
that, given some other highly plausible principles, it leads to the repug-
nant conclusion. I am unwilling to accept the repugnant conclusion.
Nor am I comfortable rejecting any premise of the argument. I therefore
regard the argument as a paradox, to which I have no satisfactory solu-
tion.
I want to conclude by suggesting, in light of this predicament, a pos-
sible avenue of further research. We observed, in Section II.A, a stark dif-
ference in plausibility between the repugnant conclusion and its intra-
personal analogue. Why is there such a difference? Answering this
question might help us to isolate where, in our argument to the repug-
nant conclusion, the repugnance seeps in.
I speculate that the answer has to do with our concern for certain
ingredients of well-being. We care very strongly about the existence of
the things in wonderful lives—things like loving relationships, creative
activities, and sophisticated pleasures. But perhaps we do not value these
things—primarily, at least—because they are good for the people whose
lives contain them. Perhaps we value these things primarily as imper-
sonal goods. This impersonal picture might explain why, in the intraper-
sonal case, we are willing to deprive Sally of any chance of enjoying these
things, for Sally’s sake, but, in the interpersonal case, are unwilling to de-
prive the world of these things.
On this view, the feeling of repugnance seeps in with our Pareto
principle. In the choice between Z (which offers each person a certainly
mediocre life) andA* (which offers each person a tiny probability of ex-
istence with a wonderful life), we are unwilling to judge that Z is better
thanA*, even if we are willing to accept that Z is better for everyone. For
A* ensures that the world contains the kinds of things that fill wonderful
lives, whereas Z deprives the world of all such things. Perhaps we care
muchmore about the existence of such things than we do about the peo-
ple who get to enjoy them.
This diagnosis of our sense of repugnance turns a common objec-
tion to classical utilitarianism on its head. The classical utilitarian is
sometimes said to regard people as mere containers of value. She wantsThis content downloaded from 192.236.036.029 on December 23, 2018 03:38:34 AM
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Ato improve people’s lives not because she cares about people for their
own sakes, but rather because she cares about the value—namely, well-
being—contained in their lives. The repugnant conclusion seems to il-
lustrate this objectionable feature of classical utilitarianism. The classical
utilitarian wants the world to contain as much value as possible, so she
wants to create as many value containers as possible. That is why she is
led to the repugnant conclusion, which (according to conventional wis-
dom) is false and repugnant precisely because people are not mere con-
tainers of value.
According to the present diagnosis, however, the repugnant conclu-
sion strikes us as repugnant precisely because people are—to us, in cer-
tain respects—containers of value. They are containers of goods that we
value more highly than the interests of the very people whose lives they
fill. This diagnosis makes me uncomfortable: I find it morally perverse to
care more about the things in people’s lives than about people them-
selves. The argument of this article suggests a possible way in which
the classical utilitarian might accept the repugnant conclusion precisely
because she cares instead about each person for her own sake—in par-
ticular, about each person’s interest in coming into existence, or in be-
ing made more likely to exist, with a happy life. This would provide some
confirmation of a claim due to Henry Sidgwick: “a Utilitarian . . . never
has to sacrifice himself to an Impersonal Law, but always for some being
or beings with whom he has at least some degree of fellow-feeling”42—
sometimes, though, for beings who might never exist.42. Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1962), 500–
501.
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